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THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN SANTO DOMINGO.
I Early History of Santo Domingo to 1844.
Between Cuba and Porto Rico lies Hispaniola, the second
largest island of the Antilles and the birthplace of European
civilization in the Western Hemisphere, Here Columbus first
stepped on the soil of the new world, and here his ashes still
repose. This island, with an area of 29,536 square miles is some-
what larger than the combined area of Massachusetts, Vermont, and
New Hampshire. Because of its location, this little island has
assumed an importance far out of proportion to its resources and
population. Situated as it is, it commands the two great passages
from the Atlantic to the Caribbean. Therefore, the great bulk of
the commerce passing through the Canal to the Pacific and the Far
East must pass through the Windward Passage between Hispaniola
and Cuba or through the Mona Passage between the island and Porto
Rico (1). Because of this strategic position, this island, con-
taining the small republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo, has played
and is still playing an important part in our Caribbean policy (2).
This policy strongly opposes any foreign interference in this re-
gion, or any lax government which might threaten the well-being of
the Canal Zone, or our entrance to it.
Although Santo Domingo comprises the eastern two-thirds
of the island, it has only one third of the population. Fertile
(1) MacCorkle, Wm. A. - The Monroe Doctrine and its Relation
to the Republic of Hait i, p. 38.
(2) Howland, C. P. - Santo Domingo_written for Amerl can_Fe:reign
Relation « - hereafter refened to as
Foreign Relations 1929. p. 67.
#
5.
(2)
soil, favorable climate, and a twelve months' growing season makes
the island extremely productive. The sun always shines, except
for short half -hour showers in the rainy season. The dry season
is cool, while the moist heat of spring and summer fosters the
rapid growth of crops. A range of temperature from the tropical
climate of the lowlands to the more temperate climate of the up-
lands makes possible a wide range of tropical and temperate plants
The best coffee known to commerce grows wild here. Sugar cane,
indigo, oranges, apples, and grapes grow with little labor or care
The wooded landB produce mahogany, satinwood, rosewood, pine, and
oak. (3). About 8,000,000 acres are farm lands, 3,000,000 are suit
able for grazing, and 9,500,000 are forest lands. In addition to
crops produced in the other West Indies, Santo Domingo produces
cacao. This crop alone in 1927 was worth over seven million dol-
lars, and was almost wholly absorbed by the United States. In
that year, the total foreign commerce amounted to over fifty-eight
million dollars, twenty-eight millions of which represented im-
ports, thus giving Santo Domingo a favorable balance of trade. Be-
fore the sugar tax of 1922, United States absorbed the greater
psrt of the Dominican sugar crop, but since then it has gone to
other markets. Tobacco ranks third in the value of exports, and
coffee fourth. The imports include rice, wheat, cotton, and silk-
manufactured goods, tools, and leather goods. Of these, sixty-
four per cent was carried in United States ships (4). The island
boasts of excellent harbors, though most of the transporation on
(3) MacQorkle, Wm. A. The Monroe Do ctrine andJLiLS Relation
to the Republic of Haiti, p. 25.
(4) Foreign Relations - 1929 p. 70.

(3)
the island itself is by road. There are two short railrods which
at the present time suffer from keen motor competition.
The early history of Santo Domingo is a troubled one.
"Before the thirteen colonies had become a nation, European im-
perial policies and private greed had indelibly written a great
deal of Caribbean history. Spaniards, Englishmen, Dutchmen,
Frenchmen and international freebooters had fought and plundered
each other for centuries" (5). In 1492 Hispaniola was inhabited
by approximately two million natives but, because of the cruelty
and greed of the Spaniards, the natives were soon exterminated.
Sugar culture began in the early 16th century, creating a demand
for labor which was satisfied by the importation of blacks from
Africa. The Dominican lands were divided up into huge plantations
which, by the end of the 18th century, were owned chiefly by ab-
sentee landlords. The head of each plantation was virtually a
dictator. The means of communication being difficult, the colonial
government was prevented from maintaining an effective supervision
over the colonists. For a short time after its discovery, Santo
Domingo was prosperous and enjoyed the position of being the capi-
tal of New Spain, but the lure of gold attracted the Spanish ad-
venturers elsewhere, and after Sir Francis Drake raided the capital
in 1586 it began a period of decline. By the end of the 18th cen-
tury, the island had become prosperous again. In 1791 and 1792 re-
volts occurred in Haiti, but they did not especially affect Santo
Domingo. In 1793 France declared war on Spain but was too busy
(5) Knight, Melvin M. - The Americans in Santo Domingo, p. 2
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in Haiti to bother with Santo Domingo. After the war was over,
the Treaty of B^le (1795) ceded the whole of the eastern portion
of the island to the French in spite of the protests of the Domin-
icans (6).
There followed a period of political unrest which, com-
bined with increased piracy in the Caribbean, destroyed the com-
merce and ruined the prosperity of the island. As a result, many
of the wealthier planters abandoned their homes. The rest of the
people deprived of their leaders and suffering from increased pov-
erty, lack of discipline, and unrest, began to give evidence of
active discontent that led to popular uprisings. In 1804, the
Republic of Haiti was established, the second republic in the Western
Hemisphere, In 1809, the Spanish colony revolted and, with the aid
of the English, captured the city of Santo Domingo, In 1821 Santo
Domingo made an unsuccessful attempt to proclaim its independence,
but was overrun and annexed by the Haitians, Sumner Welles blames
the years of Haitian domination for the anarchy, unrest, and civil
disturbances which have been prevalent in the Dominican Republic
ever since.
"During the years when the other Latin American
republics were afforded the opportunity of learn-
ing to govern themselves, Santo Domingo was pros-
trate under the domination of a tyranny, which had
for its chief object not only the eradication of
(6) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyards p. 17

the Caucasian race, but also the obliteration of
all the foundations of European culture and civi
liz8tion upon which the institutions of America
would have been builded" (7).
Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard, p. 900,

(6)
II Santo Domingo (1844-1904^ gains independence, but
political rivalries and intrigues, foreign relations
and foreign claims endanger her independence.
On February 29, 1844, the last of the Haitians having left
the capital, a provisional government began to rule until a per-
manent form of government could be established. Santana, who was
tremendously popular with the army, was proclaimed Dictator by
his troops. His government proved to be re-actionary , liberals
were imprisoned, so that those who might have aroused the people
were completely removed from the political stage. The following
July, the Provisional Government issued a decree calling for an
election to Congress. This Congress assembled, made a constitu-
tion, and elected as their president, General Pedro Santana. Be-
cause the new constitution did not give the president dictatorial
powers, Santana refused to accept the presidency until the Consti-
tution was amended to read more to his liking. This was done. The
amended Constitution gave to the Dominican president full control
of military forces until peace should be made with Haiti. Santana
took oath of office in November 1844, and chose a cabinet that
would do his bidding. During Tyler's administration, Santana
sought United States recognition. Tyler's Secretary of State,
Calhoun, advised joint recognition by the United States, France,
and Spain, but when Spain objected, the matter was dropped. Mean-
while Santana was working to get either a French or Spanish pro-
\

(7)
tectorate. In 1845, Secretary Buchanan sent an agent to Santo
Domingo to determine whether or not the new republic could maintain
its independence. He was not entirely satisfied with the report
and was convinced that recognition was not desirable unless he
was certain that Santana 's European negotiations had been unsuc-
cessful. The failure to gain European protection and recognition
by the United States upset economic conditions, and political dis-
content continued to increase. It came to a climax in a ecu spiracy
headed by the Minister of War, Jimenez, who forced Santana to re-
sign in his favor on August 4, 1848. In September, Congress
elected Santana's Secretary of War, General Manuel Jimenez, Pres-
ident of the Republic* The new President was known to be by nature
indolent, and therefore incapable of carrying out the high-handed
policy of his predecessor. He lacked every qualification necessary
for the presidency. No program of reform was formulated. No at-
tempt was made to protect Santo Domingo from the danger of a
Haitian invasion. Everything fell into confusion under a president
whose sole interest was cock-fighting. When the Haitian invasion
did come, the defense of the Dominican Republic was handled not by
the president, but by patriotic citizens who massed troops at the
frontier. The initial defeats of these troops threw the whole
country into a panic. Jimenez was apparently helpless, so Congress
under the leadership of Buenaventura Baez issued a decree calling
on Santana to come to the assistance of the government with all
the forces he could gather. Encouraged by this, the disorganized

(8)
groups of soldiers rallied around Santana until he had a follow-
ing of about six thousand. With these he succeeded in routing
the Haitians who fled in confusion across the frontier.
From this time on there was a constant struggle between
Baez and Santana for power. Jimenez, deserted by the army, and
opposed by the majority of Congress, made a last desperate attempt
to get assistance from the United States, but failed. The Santana
and Baez forces temporarily united and Jimenez resigned and fled.
Santana having proclaimed himself Dictator now called the Congress
to elect a new president. When Santana appeared before the Con-
gress to lay down his extraordinary powers as Dictator, Baez in
the name of the Congress gave him assurance "of its highest grati-
tude for the important services which he had rendered the republic,
freeing it at the same time from civil war and terming Santana in
the name of the grateful nation, a precious instrument chosen by
Heaven itself" to defend the peaple of Santo Domingo (8). The Con-
gress then elected Espaillet President who refused to be dictated
to by Santana, the leader of the army, and Baez, the leader of
Congress. After Espaillet rejected the doubtful honor, Congress
elected Baez to the presidency, and adjourned. Before adjourning,
they conferred on Santana the title "Liberator of the Fatherland,"
and General in CheAf of the Armies of the Republic. He announced
that he would support the new government.
Baez, on his inauguration (September 24, 1849) announced
a program of reform which, if carried out, would correct many of
the evils of the Dominican Republic. The only one he attempted
(8) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard, p. 94
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to force through was the attempt to gain the protection of some
strong European power, preferably France, Meanwhile a new threat
to Dominican sovereignty appeared in the person of "Emaorer Faustin
I" of Haiti, who had conceived the ambitious scheme of subjugating
the Dominican Republic and even extending his authority to some of
the near-by islands. Fearing this, and failing in his attempt to
gain French protection, Baez invited the mediation of the United
States between Haiti and Santo Domingo. The French and British
agents in the Republic protested because they wished to see Haiti
in possession of the eastern end of the island. Baez, in despera-
tion, petitioned for the joint mediation of all three. By October
1849, it was evident that French protection was not forthcoming,
owing to British opposition, and so the United States government
recognized the Republic. Baez, encouraged, renewed his negotia-
tions for a French protectorate and took the offensive against Haiti,
but again failed. Faustin then presented to Santo Domingo an offer
of peace which would destroy Dominican sovereignty. The offer was,
of course, rejected, and things were at a deadlock. Daniel Webster
sympathized with Santo Domingo and accepted joint mediation with
England and France. Forthwith the three commissioners met at Port-
au-Prince to secure the suspension of hostilities. Faustin granted
them an audience which is amusingly described by Robert Walsh, the
American Commissioner, in a report to the State Department.
"The courtyard was filled with troops in rather

motley attire, who saluted as we passed and the
hall of reception was crowded with ministers and
generals and other dignitaries who made quite a
glittering show. Soon after our entrance, the
Emperor made his appearance, in a costume which,
though rich, was not in bad taste, preceded by
shouts of 'Vive l'Empereur 1 from his courtiers,
and we were presented in due form. He seemed at
first decidedly embarrassed, as if he did not
know what to say or do ... . Faustin I is stout
and short and very black, with an unpleasant ex-
pression and a carriage that does not grace a throne.
He is ignorant in the extreme but has begun to learn
to read and write and is said to exhibit commendable
diligence in his studies. Energy and decision are
his most important traits and no soft feelings are
likely to interfere with their full display when
occasion calls them forth .... It is stated that
one of the chief causes for the Emperor ! s intended
expedition against the Dominican Republic is his
desire to be crowned in the city of Santo Domingo" (9).
As far as the United States was concerned in Dominican
affairs, there were several problems. The situation of Santo
Domingo on the highway of empire led to the expansion of the
(9) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard, p. 115
#I
(11)
Monroe Doctrine to political interference. The value of the island
and its resources attracted American capital, but the color line
prevented normal relations with a negro republic as long as the
economic basis of southern agriculture was negro slavery. Neither
Haiti nor Santo Domingo was recognized until after secession. The
Monroe Doctrine which was intended to be primarily defensive was
bound to expand due to the problem of balance of power in the
Caribbean. The tri-partite agreement between France, England and
the United States was not effective in protecting Santo Domingo
from Haiti. The United States wanted Samana Bay but did not dare
take it in the face of English and French opposition (10).
The egentB of France, England, and the United States,
unable to bring about peace, proposed a ten-year truce. Faustin
evaded the question and issued a statement through his minister
that MHis Majesty will do nothing without consulting the Senate,
his first duty being to God and to observe the Constitution" (11).
Walsh, in reporting the affair to Webster states that with great
difficulty he and his colleagues kept straight faces. The Haitian
government, to delay negotiations still further, called Congress
to discuss the affair. Congress assembled, garbed in fantastic
costumes imported from France for the occasion. Faustin's costume
was especially remarkable, topped by a chapeau decorated with
several v8rl-colored feathers. The Congress, under the influence
of Faustin, accomplished nothing, and Walsh, whose mission was
(10) Knight, Melvin M. - The Americans in Santo Domingo, pp 2-4.
(11) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 115
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limited to four months, left for home. The failure of the negoti-
ations persuaded Baez that he must depend on himself to prevent
Haitian aggression, so he called out the troops in the spring of
1851 with Santana at the head. Faustin, forced to withdraw, was
then informed that France and England recognized Dominican inde-
pendence.
Baez, having failed to gain the desired French protection
and jealous of Santana ! s popularity, now began to approach Spain
so that he might weaken Santana's position, but in February 1853
Congress chose Santana as Baez's successor. Santana had two aims
in mind: first, to eliminate Baez, who fled to Saint Thomas; and
second, to gain Spanish protection. Failing in his attempt, he
turned his attention to the United States who had sent to Santo
Domingo an agent, General William L. Cazneau, who continued to play
an important, but not commendable, part in Dominican foreign rela-
tions for some time. Pierce instructed Cazneau to obtain by treaty
a lease of the Samana Peninsula. Opposition to this developed
among the British and the French who threatened to withdraw their
continued mediation between Haiti and Santo Domingo. As this would
lead to a new Haitian invasion, President Santana was forced to
promise that he would never sell or lease any portion of Dominican
territory to any foreign power (12). Kumors were af loait that the
United States coveted Cuba, Porto Rico, and was about to annex
Santo Domingo. To prevent this, Spain modified her attitude toward
(12) Foreign Affairs 1929. p 73.
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Santo Domingo, and in 1855 made a commercial treaty. A new Spanish
agent was appointed who concentrated his efforts on creating an
unfriendly attitude toward the United States and on engineering
the return of Baez. He was successful in bringing about the resig-
nation of Santana, and Baez, who could be counted on to take orders
from Madrid, succeeded him, Baez f s hopes of a Spanish protectorate
were destroyed by the sudden recall of the Spanish agent whose
measures were repudiated by the Spanish government, Baez, convinced
now that he must depend on his own resources, and badly in need of
money, resorted to sn issue of paper money, and thus made a bad
matter rcorse. Speculators bought up the tobacco crops for paper
money and sold it in the European market for gold. Panic set in,
the paper money became worthless, and planters were ruined. As
economic dissatisfaction breeds political discontent, revolution
was in the air, encouraged by Santana ! s agents, Santana returned
successfully, laid seige to Santo Domingo City, and again assumed
control.
Embarrassed by the financial condition of the country due
to revolutions and to the fact that the Baez administration had
mortgaged government property and flooded the country with paper
money, Santana wqs convinced that his only hope lay in Spain, and
he began to negotiate, this time successfully, for a Spanish pro-
tectorate. On March 21, 1861, Spain annexed the Dominican Republic.
Among the Dominicans, there was little resentment at this turn of
affairs but rather a feeling of relief. The unfortunate experiences
through which the Dominicans had passed, the years of political un-
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rest, the continued threat of Haitian invasion, the exile of liber-
als, and the desire of the commercial and agricultural classes for
peace, made the Dominicans friendly to any government that could
maintain order and let them pursue their agricultural and commer-
cial interests undisturbed, Spain insisted that annexation had been
forced upon her and that she had no desire to interfere with the
independence of Santo Domingo, that she wished merely to protect
it from the outside world.
The Spanish protectorate, however, was not all the Domini-
cans hoped and expected it would be. Friction soon developed be-
tween Santana, as Captain General, and the Spanish officers, Spain
had promised reform, but the reform program failed to materialize,
Spanish officers took the place of natives in the Dominican army.
From Spain, Cuba, and Porto Rico, came office seekers, and the pay-
roll grew. To the disappointment of the Dominicans, Spanish annexa-
tion did not m8ke the island prosper. The Spanish government refused
to redeem the paper money and even repudiated a whole issue of fifty-
dollar notes as counterfeit, thus stirring up bitter protest. The
harsher Spanish penal code was substituted for the more enlightened
Napoleonic code. Religious intolerance took the place of tolerance,
taxes were increased, and discontent spread among all classes. In
1862, Santana resigned and his successor, a man of incredible stupid-
ity, tried to hold the opposition in check by brutal and oppressive
methods. Yellow fever thinned the ranks of the Spanish troops, the
revolutionary movement grew, the Dominican flag was hoisted, and by
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the summer of 1865 the last Spanish forces left Santo Domingo.
The withdrawal of Spain was followed by a period of anarchy.
The provisional government was helpless and our minister demanded
American warships to protect lives in the Dominican capital. Mean-
while Santana had died, but Baez was much alive and hoped to regain
power. At first he had been opposed to Spanish annexation, but
later supported it, succeeded in convincing Spain of his importance
in Dominican affairs, and was granted a subsidy. While his country-
men were suffering under Spanish tyranny, Baez was living in luxury
in Europe. When he learned that Spain was planning to abandon the
island, he began to plot for return to power. Through the efforts
of his agents, the provisional government was undermined and fell,
paving the way for the third inauguration of Baez. He immediately
adopted repressive measures, set aside the coinstitution of 1865 and
substituted for it the less liberal constitution of 1854. The rule
of the Dictator was short lived, and in less than five months revo-
lution was again in full sway, Baez was forced to flee, and General
Cabral was chosen provisional president.
During the period of Spanish occupation, Cazneau, Pierce's
appointee, had been busy trying to make personal profit out of the
political situation. He was of French Roman Catholic extraction,
born in Massachusetts, but had spent most of his life in Texas.
When Captain (later General) McClellan was sent to Santo Domingo
to make a survey in 1854, Cazneau accompanied him. During the Civil
War he was denounced as a southern sympathizer . (13
)
(13) Knight, Melvin M. The^Americans in Santo Domingo , pp 6-7.
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He formed a partnership with General Joseph W. Fabens, a man as
unscrupulous as himself. Both hoped that their friendship with
Santana would gain for them concessions, but in this they were
disappointed. When slavery was abolished in the District of Colum-
bia, and the government was encouraging the freed blacks to emigrate,
these two men formed the American West Indian Company, invested
$4,000. themselves, advertised a $2,000,000. investment in Domincan
lands, and encouraged immigration. His scheme in the American West
Indian Company was to colonize somewhat after the early Texan
method. Armed Americans who had invested in Dominican lands were to
be placed between Haiti and Santo Domingo. One group of prospective
settlers was driven out by a revolutionary movement and the remnant
of another was sent home by the American commercial agent. The
scheme worked out badly for all except Cazneau and Fabens who made
a small fortune in the deal (14). After this, the partners launched
other wildcat schemes, but their real opportunity came after the
Spanish evacuation. Secretary of State, Seward, was trying to mend
the Monroe Doctrine, which had suffered during the Civil War. He
felt the need of a West Indian naval base to remove the danger of
European aggression in the Caribbean. The choice lay between the
Danish West Indies and Samana Bay on the Atlantic side of Santo
Domingo and fairly near to the Mona Passage. Believing that
Napoleon III was trying to promote the return of Baez as a step
toward French annexation, Seward favored Samana and set sail
himself to investigate. The American minister in Santo Domingo
(14) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard, p. 314
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was habitually drunk and in no condition to be of service to the
American Secretary of State, so the task of interpreter fell to
Cazneau who made the most of his opportunity. He attempted to
convey the idea that the Dominicans wanted closer relations with
the United States. Cazneau made such favorable impression on Seward
that he seriously considered naming him Minister Resident for
United States in Santo Domingo. Americans living in the Republic
took pains to acquaint Seward with Cazneau f s past record and the
opportunity was withdrawn.
Meanwhile the Dominican government, still in a chronic
state of financial embarrassment, sounded the United States govern-
ment on the questian of a loan in return for concessions in the
region of Samana Bay. Seward immediately sent his son to negotiate
an agreement with the following instructions: The United States
was to have the right to fortify and protect the leased property.
If absolute cession was granted, the United States would pay
#2,000,000. one-half cash, and the rest in munitions. If a lease
was arranged, it must not be for less than thirty years; $10,000
to be paid on ratification, and $13,000 yearly rental. As the
Dominican government was unwilling to grant complete control of
Samana Bay, Seward rejected the Dominican offer and began to nego-
tiate for the purchase of the Danish West Indies (15).
The failure of the negotiations, the weakness of Cabral ! s
government, and the resulting domestic disturbances, gave Baez
and his followers the opportunity to spread discontent, and Cabral's
(15) Welles, Sumner - Naboth f s Vineyard, p 325.
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government was overthrown by Baez. The new president showed
willingness to lease Samana Bay on more favorable terms, but his
position was so unstable that Seward held off. The Senate having
rejected the treaty for annexing the Danish West Indies, the time
seemed ripe to resume the Samana Bay negotiations, Baez was will-
ing to sell Samana Bay and Peninsula for |l, 000, 000 in gold and
the same amount in munitions. If the United States refused to
accept, Baez would be obliged to make similar proposals to England,
France, and Spain. The quarrel between Johnson and the Senate
delayed action until Grant's administration. In 1869, Baez, real-
izing that financial conditions were bad and that he was on the
verge of a downfall, again approached the State Department on the
subject of annexation. He stressed the riches of his country, the
poverty of his people, the undeveloped natural resources, and added
that his people longed for annexation to United States "whose institu-
tions they loved above those of all other nations" (16). Grant
himself favored annexation but he met stubborn opposition in Congress
He sent an agent to find out Dominican sentiment in regard to annexa-
tion in return for the assumption of the Dominican debt by the
United States and a United States protectorate until the question
could be referred to a plebiscite. In spite of opposition in the
Senate and in the Cabinet agreements were signed November 29, 1869,
£or the lease of Samana Bay and annexation (17). The treaty was
laid before the Senate and in a special message to the Senate,
(16) Thomas, D. Y. - One Hundred Years of the jfonroe Do ctri&e p 218
(17 ) Welles, Sumer - Naboth^s_ Vineyard, p 379
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Grant urged ratification. Sumner, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Commit te in the Senate, and who was then working for annexation
of Canada, threw his influence on the side of the opposition and
the treaty was defeated by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-ei$it (18 ).
Sumner severely criticised the corrupton of the Grant administration,
and in an interview given to the New York World, declared that a
friend of his who lived in Santo Domingo had told him that the coast
of Samana Bay was staked off into lots marked "Baez", "Cazneau",
"Babcock", and "Grant" (19). Congress appointed a commission to
make a visit of inquiry in Santo Domingo. On January 16, 1871,
the three commissioners, Senators Benjamin Wade, Andrew D. White,
and Samuel G. Howe, arrived in Santo Domingo on the Steamship Ten-
nessee. The Commission carried on a superficial investigation,
spending twenty-two days in the capital city and therefore its
findings were not worth much (20). The report of the Commission
transmitted to Congress, April 5, 1871, sustained Grants point of
view, but no action was taken (21). American vessels were withdrawn
and Baez finally leased Samana Bay to a private company, the Samana
Bay Company of Santo Domingo (1872). The following year, he was
overthrown (Jaruary 2, 1874).
Then followed ten years of anarchy, a succession of mili-
tary presidents who served a few weeks and were overthrown by new
revolutions. After the overthrow of Baez, General Gonzalez became
president, and one of his first acts was to cancel the concessions
(18) Thomas, D. Y. - One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine p.
(19) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p.J396
(20) Knight, Melvin M. - The Americans in Santo Domingo p. 13
(21) Senatorial Report of the United States Commission _of
Inquiry In SantcTltomingo
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to the Samaria Bay Company, Because of an attempt at revolution
under General Caceres, Gonzalez decided the government was too
liberal and adopted repressive measures which, together with the
bad financial conditions, led to his downfall and the election
of Don Ulises Francis y Espaillat (1876), He was unique in that
he was unselfishly devoted to the interests of Santo Domingo, ad-
vocated no foreign entanglements, insisted on only legitimate
taxes, and no further issues of paper money, Baez and his followers
plotted hljB overthrow so successfully that by March 1877 Baez was
again in power. In the summer of 1878, Gonzalez was again elected
and served till September when he abdicated (22).
In May 1880 a fine type of patriot, Padre Merino, was
elected president and inaugurated a period of peace and material
prosperity. Imports increased, more sugar lands were planted, and
many immigrants came from Cuba and Porto Rico. The energetic ac-
tion of the government caused the failure of a Baez-Gonzalez con-
spiracy. In September 1882, a regular constitutional election was
held, and General Ulises Heureaux was elected. This "marks the
commencement of an epoch of seventeen years during wEuich the inter-
ests, the development and even the fate of the Dominicans as a
sovereign and independent nation were obscured and merged in the
destinies of one man, the negro, Ulises Heureaux (23).
The whole administration was the struggle of one man to
maintain power. His first administration was quiet and uneventful.
His policy was one of conciliation. Freedom of speech and press
(22) Welles, Sumner - NaboJdil^Jfinj^arja p. 431-432.
(23) Welles, Sumner - Kaboth^s Vineyard p. 444

(21)
was at first allowed, but when the time came for a new election in
the spring of 1884, by underground methods he got rid of his oppon-
ent and secured re-election. He resorted to bribing his political
opponents to keep control of the government, If this failed, he
resorted to exile or assassination. He secured the revision of the
constitution to extend the term of the presidency and to modify the
method of election so that he might retain power. In dealing with
foreign nations his policy was to play one off against the other.
The finances of the Republic had been going from bad to worse and
tha bonded debt had risen to such a figure that Heureaux (1888)
sought relief in the European Westendorp Company, who floated a
loan of £770,000 at 6%, and in 1890 another of L900,000. This
company was given the right to collect customs duties, and United
States did not protest. As this company was not very successful,
the right to collect customs was transferred to the Santo Domingo
Improvement Company organized under the laws of the state of New
York (24). This gave Heureaux a short breathing space, and although
there were signs of rebellion they were rapidly crushed.
The Harrison administration then succeeded in negotiating
and ratifying a reciprocity treaty putting Dominican sugar, molasses,
coffee and hides on the free list and giving twenty-six American
commodities free entry to Santo Domingo. Germany thereupon
threatened tariff reprisals which would interfere with the sale
of Dominican tobacco and thus stir up active discontent in the
tobacco growing provinces of Cibao, The Harrison administration
(24) Foreign Relations 1929 . p 77
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then took up again the Samana Bay lease, but when rumors leaked
out that such negotiations were in progress, Heureaux denied them
and the lease was further delayed.
Then followed a program of recklessness and wastefulness,
tyranny 8nd corruption that won for Heureaux popular hatred and
eventually caused his downfall. The financial needs were pressing
and the political situation at home was a menace to his peaceful
election due to the increasing popularity of General Generoso
Marchena , the financial agent who had negotiated the Westendorp
loan. To counteract the growth of American influence in the
Caribbean, he evolved a scheme to improve the financial situation
by indirect intervention of European powers through a European
syndicate composed of citizens of the chief European countries.
In 1893, Marchena announced that he would oppose Heureaux in the
presidential contest. The Dictator, who controlled the political
machine, easily defeated him, imprisoned him, and finally had him
shot. As time went on, Heureaux f s position became more and more
difficult and his administration degenerated into a reign of terror.
"He forgot to conciliate and remained only to oppress" (25). He
maintained an extensive spy system that reached to United States
and even to European capitals, In every settlement in the Dominican
Republic he kept a mistress who informed him of any signs of active
resistance to the Dictator's policies. His late years were marked
by loss of self-restraint, and increasing cruelty. He filled the
prisons with the more promising younger Dominicans, especially per-
(25) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 515
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secuting those who seemed to aspire to the presidency. Some qf
these he assassinated, but some saved their skins by flight,
Heureaux ! s final downfall was brought about by a Revolu-
tionary Junta organized by General Horacio Vasquez aided by Don
Federico Velasquez. Obtaining some financial aid from Europe
they planned a revolution in 1894 and 1895, inviting Don Juan
Isidro Jimenez to be the leader. Jimenez had other plans up
his sleeve and not only declined the offer, but broadcast the fact
that he had been so honored, to gratify his own vanity, and the Junta
was forced to dissolve. In the early summer Jimenez tried to carry
out his own plan, l«ided troops in Monte Christi, but was miserably
defeated.
By 1898, Heureaux was pretty near the end of his rope.
The price of purchasing his own security had been such a drain
on the treasury that his money was gone and his credit, too. The
country faced bankruptcy, and active discontent was everywhere.
Market people refused to bring their crops to market ai d sell
them for depreciated paper money. Heureaux, driven to desperation,
suggested that though the general public was opposed to the cession
of Samana Bay, the United States might seize it to satisfy a sup-
posed claim. He also suggested that with $300,000. he might by
propaganda change public opinion in favor of the cession. The
United States then declared that they were not interested in the
actual cession of Samana Bay, but they were willing to negotiate
for a lease. In May 1899, Heureaux presented to the new United
States Minister to Santo Domingo, a draft of a secret treaty

(24)
which would make United States the protector of Santo Domingo (26).
This was also rejected by the St8te Department. But Heureaux's
days were numbered end a new revolutionary movement agsin led by
General Vasquez cut short the Dictator's career by the Dictator's
own favorite method, assassination. Thus ended a shameful admin-
istration, honey-combed with corruption, characterized by unconsti-
tutional methods, increased public debt, arbitrary arrest, imprison-
ment, assassination
,
decay of agriculture 8nd commerce, over-issue
and consequent depreciation of paper money, 8nd worst of all the
dulling of liberal feeling in the minds of the younger generation.
The assassination of Heureaux found the Dominican people
in what seemed to be a state of hopeless indifference to the polit-
ical situation and the revolutionary leaders were discouraged by the
lack of public response. General Vasquez, who had overthrown the
unpopular Dictatorship, and who could have become Provisional Presi-
dent, now stepped aside in favor of Don Juan Isidro Jirenez, whose
sole qualification seemed to be his apparently unbounded wclth. It
was commpnly supposed that his wealth would remove the poverty of
all. As a matter of fact, his wealth was only a myth. His ill-
starred revolutionary activity and the Heureaux regime had loA for
him his fortune, and his chief motive for seeking office was to re-
coup his personal fortune. On October 20, he was elected president,
with Vasquez vice-president, but harmony did not long prevail •
(26) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 330
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III Unpaid financial obligations and resulting
threat of foreign interference in Domincan
affairs leads to a United States receiver-
ship 8nd increased interference *vw>( ccCJU^oJU
Secretary Hay, anxious to show a friendly attitude toward
the new government, instructed Mr, Powell, the American minister,
not to press the payment of American claims. Powell disregarded
the instructions and thus provoked hostility toward the American
government. This was demonstrated by an order which excluded the
Improvement Company from collecting the customs {27). The Improve-
ment Company appealed to Washington. Jimenez sent the Minister of
Foreign Affairs to Washington to represent the Dominican interests.
The Company claimed $11,000,000. for bonds still held, and its
interest in railroads, and other rights. Vasquez, who had overthrown
Jimenez in 1902, signed an agreement with the United States fixing
the amount due as $4, 500, 000. and leaving the method of payment to
be determined by a board of arbitration composed of two Americans
and one Dominican (28). This board met in Washington and handed
down an award in 1904 which provided that Santo Domingo should pay
to the Improvement Company and certain other companies four and a
half million as full indemnity for their property rights and claims.
It marked out three customs houses as security and appointed the
Vice President of the Improvement Company as a financial agent.
Payments were to be made in monthly installments of $25,000. each.
If the Dominican government failed to pay said installments, the
financial agent was to take over the customs houses in certain
(27) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 530
(28) Foreign Relations 1929 p. 78
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ports. Until the debt was paid there was to be no reduction in
duties (29).
A bitter political dispute resulted. Vasquez, though loyal
to the government, opposed the contract and it was soon evident that
the breach was widening between President and Vice-president. This
was partly due to the disagreement over the" contract and party due
to inability of the government to solve the financial crisis. Salari
were unpaid and a deficit resulted. The followers of Jimenez were
known as the Jimenistas and those of Vasquez, the Horacistas.
Jimenez was accused of failing to account for expenditures of a
large part of the yearly revenue. The financial confusion was made
worse by a presidential decree increasing the salaries of government
employees by fifty per cent. Congress protested by passing a vote
of censure charging that the presidBnt had exceeded his powers.
Vasquez tried to persuade Jimenez to modify his course and with
every intention of supporting the administration offered an armed
force to put down a revolutionary movement then in force. Jimenez,
suspicious of Vasquez's motives, refused and soon the Jimenistas
and the Horacistas were up in arms against each other resulting in
the overthrow of Jimenez. Vasquez thereupon came to power as pro-
visional president and immediately proposed an ambitious program of
reform, including a budget, encouragement of agriculture, a plan to
discourage revolution by disarming individuals, a hope to establish
credit abroad, and above all a promise for an honest administration.
In spite of the promising program the Vasquez government was not
destined to live long. When the government was less than six months
(29) Thomas, D. Y. One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine p. 22 2
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old it had a revolution on its hands which helped to create a
deficit. Many were dissatisfied because Vasquez refused to continue
the subsidies granted by Jimenez to local politicians. The followers
of Heureaux did their best to increase dissatisfaction by reminding
the Dominicans of the peace of the Heureaux administration. A large
number of political prisoners were collected in the capital and they
finally succeeded in gaining control of the city. American and Ger-
man troops were landed to protect the American end German consulates.
Vasquez, ill and discouraged because the people were apparently will-
ing to accept the followers of Heureaux, fled to Cuba.
After the overthrow of Vasquez, the politial situation
of the Dominican Republic became more confused than ever. In April
1903, General Wos y Gil became provisional president, The follow-
ing July he became constitutional president, but was overthrown in
November by a revolution under the leadership of General Morales
who became the head of the provisional government. While Morales
was president there was a three-cornered revolution in progress,
the government party, followers of Wos y Gul, the Jimenistas, and
the Horacistas. This condition lasted until 1904. Outlaws roamed
the country and much property was destroyed, including sugar planta-
tions. Italy 8nd Germany were pressing their claims and the Domini-
cans, to satisfy them, signed an agreement promising them part of
the customs house receipts. American interests were especially
heavy. Investments in sugar and banana plantations alone amounted
to over $20,000,000. The United Fruit Company held more than 18,000
1
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acres representing an investment of half a million, Americans were
exporting woods, developing oil fields. Foreigners owned wharf
rights in three main ports and owned commercial houses and steamship
lines(30). Santo Domingo f s foreign policy had been a dangerous one
for her peace and prosperity. She had dodged her financial obliga-
tions, made worthless pledges, and kept her accounts carelessly.
In late 1904 she became bankrupt. No one knew the extent of her
debt, but it was estimated between twenty-five and fifty million.
Commerce was stagnant due to high wharf and harbor charges. Two-
thirds of her income was devoted to putting down revolutions.
Three-fourths of the debt was owed to foreigners who continued to
clamor for payment, and the same revenue and customs were pledged
over and over again to different countries (31). With the coming
of Roosevelt we have a new and more vigorous, but withal a practical
policy in dealing with the Caribbean. Howard Hill summarizes it as
follows
:
"Roosevelt Imperialism as manifested in the
Caribbean was opportunist in character, not planned
or predetermined • • • • Roosevelt was led from one
action to another by the swift current of events, which
during his administration seemed to change with
kaleidoscopic rapidity . • • Launched upon the pro-
ject of an isthmian canal, which he had advocated
for years, he soon found himself engaged in problems
arising from the relationship which that enterprise
(30) Review of Reviews March 1905 p. 294
(31) Foreign Relations^ 1929 p. 79
pi
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bore to the wider circle of the Caribbean, Thus
he became involved first in Colombia, next in
Venezuela, then in Santo Domingo and finally in
Central America. With each problem he dealt in
the manner of a practical man of affairs rather than
in the fashion of the doctrinaire or the man of pre-
determined policies • ... In his relationship with
the backward peoples of the tropics, with the excep-
tion of Colombia, his attitude was paternalistic,
his policy that of benevolent imperialism. With
him the old era of isolation passes forever and
the new era of world influence comes to the full
dawn" (32).
The success of the United States financial agent appointed
in 1904 led other foreign states to press their claims. France,
Belgium, and Italy, losing patience, threatened to sieze the cus-
toms houses which might lead to the danger of occupation for an
indeterminate period. In his extremity, the president of the
Dominican Republic appealed to the United States for assistance
in freeing it from its difficulties with European creditors. While
Morales was seeking American intervention, Germany was considering
the purchase of Spanish, Italian and Belgian claims against the
Dominican Republic. Roosevelt determined to act swifty. He in-
structed Secretary Hay to call the American Minister in Santo
(32) Hill, Howard C. - Roosevelt and the Caribbean p. 192 -.212
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Domingo to see if the government would request the Unitdd States
to take charge of the collection of duties in order to bring about
a settlement with creditors. Fearing that it would lose everything,
Santo Domingo agreed to make the "request". An agreement was reached
providing that all ports be taken over by the United States, that
the United States should direct the collection of the customs, pay-
ing 45% of the receipts to the government for expenses and the re-
maining 55% to the creditors. A commission was to be appointed
to determine the amount of indebtedness to each creditor (33).
Roosevelt submitted the treaty to the Senate justifying himself
as follows:
"It has for some time been obvious that those
who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept cer-
tain responsibilities along with the rights which
it confers • • • • The justification for the United
States taking this burden and incurring this responsi-
bility is to be found in the fact that it is incom-
patible with international equity for the United
Sta t6s to refuse to allow other powers to take the
only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims
of their creditors and yet to refuse itself to take
any other steps. The conditions in the Dominican
Republic not only constitute a menace to our rela-
tions with other foreign nations, but also concern
the prosperity of the people of the island as well
(33) Foreign Relations 1929 p. 80
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as the security of American interest of the South
Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal expansion of
which commerce lies in that direct ion" (34 ) •
Roosevelt further warned that temporary occupation would
lead to permanent occupation and that the United States could not
see any European power permanently occupy any of these republics.
Furthermore, if the United States refused to render assistance In
regulating Dominican finance, and foreign states resorted to com-
pulsion, the American creditors would lose everything. He denied
any intention of taking any part of Santo Domingo or exercising
any other control over the island. The Senate unconvinced, adjourned
in March 1905 without taking action. The failure of the Senate to
ratify the treaty endangered the stability of the Dominican govern-
ment and made it impossible for them to obtain sufficient revenue.
The creditors were weary of delay, and the Dominican government
was helpless, Roosevelt determined, on his authority as chief
executive, to carry the agreement through and drew up therefore
a modus Vivendi carrying practically the same provisions as the
protocol. Under this agreement he sent down collectors and war-
ships to give them support. For a year this scheme was in opera-
tion without senatorial consent and with encouraging results.
Creditors ceased pressure, commerce increased, and with it the
revenues. The United States government then commissioned an ex-
pert to determine the amount of the Dominican debt,
(34) Roosevelt - Special Message to Senate - Feb. 15, 1905,
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Meanwhile, Morales had been overhtrown and was succeeded
by General Caceres, who gave the Dominican government five years of
orderly government. He had all the qualities of a popular leader
but was not a statesman. He wisely depended for executive ability
and technical knowledge on Don Federico Velasquez y Hernandez who
had played an important part in the ranks of the Horacista party,
but who was never popular with the people. These two men gave to
Santo Domingo an administration superior to any the republic had
ever known. With the modus vivendi in operation the government was
f\ running without deficit for the first time (35). In June 1906,
Velasquez came to the United States and in collaboration with Dr.
Hollander, a financial expert, framed a plan that called for a bond
issue of $20,000,000. to pay the total claims against the government
which had been scaled down to $17,000,000. The President of the
United States was to appoint a Receiver General of Dominican Customs
who, on the first of each month was to pay to the fiscal agent for
the loan, #100,000. If the receipts in any one year exceeded §3,000,000
one half of the surplus would beafplied to a sinking fund for the
redemption of the bonds. Until the whole debt was paid, the public
debt should not be increased except by agreement of the United
States and Santo Domingo (36). So bitter was the opposition to the
Convention in Santo Domingo that ratification seemed hopeless but
it was finally accepted and was approved by the United States Senate
February 25, 1907. Although Dominican credit had been destroyed by
various defaults on bond issues, these bonds guaranteed by the
(35) Welles, Sumner - Nab^jthJ_s_JVin5ya.rd p. 643
(36) Journal of Race Development IV (1913-1914
Hollander, Jacob H. The Dominican Convention, it s
Lesson, p. 399-400.
I
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UnitSd States were considered a good investment. So successful
was the scheme that the entire debt was paid by 1927, Wharf and
harbor concessions were cancelled, internal improvements were
built, commercial and industrial conditions were good (37). Increase
in trade meant increase in revenue. In 1908 Caceres was re-elected
to serve until 1914. During his administration, a program of
public works was started and sanitary conditions were improved.
In spite of general prosperity, rebellion still persisted
but the government, now firmly established, was not greatly alarmed.
The armed forces were now properly fed, clothed and paid. The pres-
ident was popular though there was growing opposition to Velasquez.
Realizing that the government was too strong to be overthrown, a
conspiracy was set on foot to capture the president and force his
resignation. A small band of conspirators, determined to go even
further, lay in wait for him while he was enjoying his daily ride
and f shot and killed him. To these conspirators may be attributed
the anarchy of the years that followed.
General Victoria siezed power and compelled the election
of his uncle by the same name. The entire country relapsed into
confusion. All gains of the preceding five? years were swept away.
Rebellion was everywhere, and in a few months the Victorian govern-
ment had wasted the surplus Jeft by the preceding administration
and increased the public debt by $1,500,000 thus violating the
Convention of 1907 (38). General Vasquez and Senor Velasquez were
now determined to support any government that was strong enough to
(37) Foreign Relations 1929 p§§ or Welles, Sumner - Nabothls
Vineyard p. 664
(38) Foreign Kelations 1929 p. 85

(34)
overthrown the Victoria government.
With the accession of Taft aifrd Secretary Knox, we have
the American policy in Santo Domingo completely changed. In place
of the courteous, helpful spirit shown by the Roosevelt administra-
tion, we have a commercialized policy which showed complete lack
of understanding of the Dominicans and which served to foster a
suspicion of the imperialistic aims of the United States. Roose-
velt and Root had treated the republic as a sovereign state, Taft
and Knox treated it as a sort of protectorate. The new minister to
Santo Domingo, Mr, William W. Russell, in a letter to Secretary
Knox, advised complete control by our government as the only way
to establish a permanent peace and suggested that the United States
occupy the customs houses, "Having once landed men for the protec-
tion of the customs houses in accordance with our rights under the
Convention we might be able to dictate a policy beneficial to the
Republic" (39),, As a result of the report two commissioners and
750 marines were sent to investigate, Victoria was negotiating for
a new loan to cancel the indebtedness of his government, a request
which was refused unless the government would assume the responsibil-
ity for misappropriation of government funds and agree to appoint
an American financial advisor. The commissioners charged the
government with violation of the Convention of 1907, demanded a new
election, a loan and the appAintment of an American financial ad-
viser. Moreover, they threatened, if the demand were refused, to
impose a military government on the Dominicans, The Commission
(39) Letter from Russell to sec, Knox Sept, 19, 1912. Quoted in
Sumner welles' Naboth's Vineyard p. 694 and Foreign Relations
p. 84,
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proposed Adolf o A. Nouel, Archbishop of Santo Domingo, as provision-
al president. General Vasquez was forced to accept, and the revolu-
tionary movement subsided. Victoria at once offered his resigna-
tion which was immediately accepted. Shortly after, Nouel was e-
lected provisional president for two years (40).
The solution proposed by the Commission did not remedy the
situation. The new president tried to give his country an impar-
tial administration but the demand for favors and criticisms of
his appointments discouraged him. There was much factional strife
especially between the Jimenista and Horacista parties. Nouel,
realizing that the only hope of averting anarchy lay in a general
election, asked the United States support. Knox, under the impres-
sion that he understood the Dominican situation, insisted on reform
of the electoral system before the election. Nouel, helpless, re-
signed and fled to Europe leaving Velasquez and Don Juan Isidro
Jimenez struggling for the presidency.
Wilson, who came to power in 1913, stated his Latin-American
policy as follows:
we
"What we desire to do and what/shall do is
to show our neighbors to the south of us that
their interests are identical with our inter-
ests,that we have no plans or any thought of our
own exaltation, but have in view only the peace
and the prosperity of the people of our own
hemisphere" (41).
(40) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 700
(41) Wilson - The New Democracy p. 121

(36)
He attacked the commercialized foreign policy of Knox and
announced that the United States would never again seek one addi-
tional foot of territory by conquest (42). But in spite of Wilson's
idealistic policy he was not successful in carrying it out* The
problems that were troubling Santo Domingo were the sort that
needed a representative of experience and ability who knew local
conditions. Bryan secured the appointment of James Mark Sullivan,
"a deserving Democrat" (43 ) as a political regard. He was a man
who has been characterized as gaining all his political experience
in ward politics.
A new election was soon called in Santo Domingo and in
spite of Dominican protests United States agents took it upon
themselves to secure an election by "free and fair ballot". The
Knox Commission had been sent only to advise, but the supervision
in elections was taken over the protests of the Dominicans, with
no justification and is the first evidence of the gradually increas-
ing disregard for the sovereign rights of Santo Domingo. This ac-
tion on the part of the United States was interpreted as a proof of
the lack of confidence of the United States in the Dominican govern-
ment and served to encourage revolution under the leadership of
the habitual revolutionist, General Arias. By the middle of April
1914, insurrection was again general, all semblance of constitution-
al government having disappeared. The contest narrowed down to a siege
of Puerto Plata which, though held by the revolutionists, was de-
clared a neutral zone by the United States, The Commander of the
j1 (42) Welles Sumner Nabotbjs Vineyard p. 716
(43) Knight', M. M. The Americans in Santo Domingo p. 53.
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United States vessel forbade the bombardment of the city. Presi-
dent Bordas ignored the order and his forces were fired on by the
United States forces. Bitter resentment on the part of the
government forces resulted, as they interpreted the action as
showing sympathy with the revolutionists.
In the meantime General Vasquez secretly returned and
reached an agreement with Don Juan Isidro Jimenez which would have
resulted in a successful revolutionary movement if all factions
had not been informed that the United States was about to propose
a plan to restore order in Santo Domingo. This plan, sponsored
by Wilson, called for the resignation of Bordas, a new election
under United States supervision, a demand that revolutionary move-
ments cease, and reaffirmed the right of the United States inter-
vention (44). Dr. Ramon Baez was named provisional president.
Arias did not wish to recognize him but, on threat of arrest by
American marines, did so, After the inauguration, Baez entered an
agreement with the American Commission providing that an election
for a constitutional president and congress be held six weeks later,
that at this election observers appointed by the United States
should be present and should be afforded the fullest opportunity
to observe the casting of ballots. The new provisional president
sympathized with the Jimenista party which supported Don Juan
Isidro Jimenez, who was elected by a small majority in the regular
election held October 25, 1914. The Horacista party protested
that the result was due to partiality, that the electors were not
(44) Kni$it. The Americans in Santo Domingo p. 59
1
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distributed according to population, that the election was corrupt
and therefore should be annulled*
By this time, Baez was loath to turn the government over
to the new president and became Horacista in sympathy, but Vasquez
insisted on orderly procedure and Jimenez was inaugurated December
1914, appointing both Arias and Velasquez members of his cabinet,
Jimenex had promised to keep the American financial adviser, and
Mr. Charles M. Johnston was appointed by secretary Bryan as
"Comptroller of Finances of the Dominican Republic", instructed to
provide a budget and to approve and countersign any payment made
by the Dominican government* The president was to place the collec-
tion of internal revenue in the hands of the Receiver and the United
States was to assist in organizing a constabulary in the Republic
to replace the Dominican army. Jimenez tried to gain congressional
approval but was vigorously opposed by the Horacista and Arias forces
who defeated the agreement in Congress. Jimenez was in a most diffi-
cult position. He dared not dismiss the financial minister for fear
he would offend the United States. If he allowed him to remain
he would displease the Dominican Congress (45 ) • Because Mr. Johnston
was retained, Congress adopted a resolution of impeachment 8nd
Jimenez was forced to appeal to the State Department at Washington.
Bryan's appointment of Sullivan to the post of Minister to the Domini
can Republic was a bad mistake. What Santo Domingo needed was a man
who possessed a knowledge of Dominican history and a sympathetic
understanding of Dominican problems. Bryan f s instructions show a
(45) Knight - Americans in Santo Domingo p. 61
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lack of understanding of Dominican affairs. They pay no atten-
tion to the fact that for two years the little republic had been
torn by anarchy and revolution (46). Bryan warned the Dominican
Congress not to attack Jimenez and proceeded to discuss the situ-
n
ation with two commissioners saj to Washington by Jimenez, Don
Federico Velasquez, Don Jacinto Velasquez, 8nd Dr. Francisco
Henriquez y Carvajsl, but no satisfactory agreement was reached
and soon after, Bryan resigned. "Sullivan and Bryan bad com-
pletely undermined American prestige. To many Dominicans, Uncle
Sam was a wolf looking for a l8mb to devour, and to most of the
heel=»
rest he was an ass whose capricious
A
had to be watched" (47 )
•
In the spring of 1915, local rebellions occurred and gen-
eral revolution threatened. Secretary Lansing informed the leaders
through the American Charge d 'Affaires, that President Jimenez
would receive from United States all the assistance necessary "to
compel respect of the adminie tration" (48). At the same time he
accused the administration of spending too much keeping armed forces
in the field. By midsummer, due to political unrest and continued
fear of assassination, Jimenez was very near a mental and physical
breakdown. In Septerrber of the same year, Mr. William W. Russell,
who had been Taft's appointee as Minister to Santo Domingo, was
again appointed with instructions to warn the Dominican Republic
that the United States would no longer tolerate the violation of
Article II in the 1907 Convention, which forbade the increase in
the "public debt". The term "public debt" was int erpre/ted differ-
(47) Knight - Americans in Santo Domingo p. 64
(48) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 75
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ently by the United States and Dominican authorities. To the
Dominicans it meant the bonded debt; to Washington it meant all
outstanding indebtedness. The United States justified its inter-
pretation on the ground that increased indebtedness in backward
countries might produce internal unrest and foreign complications.
The Dominicans insisted that a financial adviser appointed by the
United St8tes and an American organized constabulary would be "an
inextinguishable germ of trouble" (50 )•
On November 19, 1915, one week after Haiti had ratified
a treaty giving United States military and financial control, a
similar note was presented to President Jimenez, The note formally
demanded that the United States be given charge of the finances
and the army which would make Santo Domingo a protectorate. These
demands were rejected and an appeal was made to President Wilson
who was extremely buBy with the European situation and whose reply
was unsatisfactory. Because of Jimenez's inability to come to some
satisfactory agreement with the United States, opposition increased
and the following April a disagreement sprung up between Jimenez
and his Minister of War, Desidero Arias. Arias had adopted the
policy of constant pressure brought to bear on the government to
force the resignation of Jimenez and secure his own election,
Jimenez needed funds to check this movement by force but this could
not be done without the consent of the United States so he made
appeal to Wilson who answered his appeal by a promise to give
"friendly sdvice and continued support to any wise reforms" (51 )
•
(50) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 762
(51) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 765
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This was not very satisfactory to the president who needed, instead
of "friendly advice", money and troops to combat the plots of Arias
who now succeeded in getting control of Santo Domingo City,
On May first the Dominican Congress started impeachment
proceedings against Jimenez, Arias had control of the capital.
The American minister, insisting that Jimenez needed the assistance
of American marines, on May 14 landed troops to protect the lega-
tions and to aid in the restoration of peace and order. Troops
were offered to Jimenez but he hesitated to maintain his authority
by means of foreign bayonets and requested munitions alone, but
his request was denied. Convinced that the landing of fcarines
was a violation of Dominican sovereignty Jimenez resigned snd set
sail for Puerto Rico,
Arias was persuaded to confer with Don Federico in the
American legation, where he was offered certain favors and some
remuneration if he would use his influence and his soldiers to
bring about the election of Velasquez, but he refused and retired
into the interior where his forces disbanded for lack of pay. The
Dominican Congress wished to elect a new president but was requested
not to meet until the city had "assumed its normal aspect" (52),
On May 18, the Congress was requested not to elect a president for
fear It would give rise to political disturbances. Meanwhile
marines were landed at various strategic points penetrating the
interior, establishing order and disarming the inhabitants. The
only serious opposition was in the north where the Arias faction was
(52) Knight - p. 75
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strong. On July 18, the Receivership was directed to collect inter-
nal revenues as well as customs and the Receiver General became the
disbursing agent for the Republic,
The American Minister was determined to postpone the elec-
tion of the provisional president by Congress until he was sure
Arias would not be elected. The Dominican Congress, impatient of
delay, expressed willingness to accept a compromise candidate,
satisfactory to both Vasquez and Arias, Dr. Federico Henriquez y
Carvajal. The American minister was determined that this candidate
should not be elected because he refused to grant the United States
the powers her representatives were demanding. It looked as if
Carvajal would be elected in spite of the protests of the United
Stat es, but he finally withdrew his candidacy. The American
marines continued to occupy strategic points "for the purpose of
supporting constitutional authority and to put a stop to revolu-
tion and to consequent disorders detrimental to the ordered pro-
gress and tm. prosperity of the country" (53 ) . The United States
government denied their intention of acquiring territory or of
attacking Dominican sovereignty but insisted that they would remain
until revolutionary movements had been put down and until needed
reforms had been introduced (54).
Congress ended the deadlock by electing on July 25, 1916,
Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, the brother of Don Federico
and a distinguished physician, the provisional p- esident for six
months until a general election could be held. Washington refused
(53) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 727
(54) " " — - 777
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to recognize him unless he would sign the treaty which had been pre-
sented making Santo Domingo a United States protectorate. The
provisional president had no intention of giving in to the American
demands and so the Receiver General of Customs was directed to sus-
pend payment of givernment funds. As a result the government was
penniless. No salaries were paid and the whole government machinery
was paralyzed. The president and cabinet asked for a compromise
but Washington refused to consider it. Conditions gradually grew
worse. Troops assumed police functions. American officers at-
tempted to censor the Dominican press, the overbearing attitude
of some of the officers caused resentment. In other words, this
high-handed policy changed the attitude of the Dominicans toward
the United States from one of friendliness to one of general
hostility. The Dominican minister at Washington was instructed
to make a final appeal. His plan emphasized four points:
1. 8 plea for United States recognition of
Dominican sovereignty,
2. a protest that the withholding of govern-
ment funds was contrary to the Convention
of 1907.
3. a criticism of the fact that American
employees of Dominican government had
been paid, and
4. an assertion of the readiness of the
Dominican government to discuss and
reasonable terms. (55).
(55) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 789-790
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Secretary Lansing, in a memorandum to Wilson on November
1916, summarized the Dominican situation as follows:
An election in Santo Domingo would put Arias in
control. He has been a disturbing element in
Santo Domingo for many years,
Santo Domingo has refused to allow the United
States to establish financial control and a
constabulary.
An economic crisis exists due to the withholding
of funds by the United States,
The only solution seems to be martial law for
Santo Domingo (56),
) Foreign Relations 1929 p. 91
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IV. Military Occupation of Santo Domingo by
the United States 1916-1924.
At this time President Wilson's whole attention was occu-
pied with European problems and he reluctantly approved. On No-
vember 29, 1916, a proclamation of occupation was made by the
United States and signed by Captain H. S. Khapp. He assured the
people that he was not trying to destroy Domincan sovereignty, but
to bring about order. The following reasons for military occupation
were given:
(1 ) Santo Domingo had failed to live up to the Convention
of 1907 (57)
(2) The United States had tried to aid the Dominican
government but the latter had refused to adopt the
suggested measures.
In a Navy Department memorandum the reasons for occupying Santo
Domingo were given. As it was desirable to have peaceful conditions
close to our boundaries, the United States had prepared a new treaty
with Santo Domingo to maintain order and guarantee the payment of
Dominican financial obligations. The treaty was the price of recog-
nition of the new government but as it was refused the Unit ed
States refused to pay revenue to the government. From August 1916
to November, things were at a deadlock, The United States, failing
to persuade the Dominican Kepublic to conduct its government in a
manner conducive to peace, resorted to military occupation. Five
(57) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 794
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days later the Dominican Minister at Washington protested on the
ground that such an act could be justified only as an act of war. (58
When we entered the Great War, our interest shifted to
the problem of finishing the war in Europe and making a lasting
peace. Reports came that the military government in Santo Domingo
was busy building roads and schools, keeping order, keeping down
corruption, and paying the public debt though complaints against
the military government became more and more common. Charges were
made that martial law was enforced, public meetings suppressed,
the press censored, that trials were by court martial and that
all government functions had been taken over by United States
marines, that all the Dominicans filled in action were classed
as bandits, that military government had expected the Dominican
chiefs to cooperate with them, but when they refused the govern-
ment posts were filled with navy officers.
Knapp f s primary aims were (1) to liquidate the outstand-
ing claims; (2) to survey the courtry to establish legitimate
land titles; (3) to estallish a Dominican Civil Service. With
this program in view a claims commission was appointed which
pared the claim against Santo Domingo from $12,000,000. to
13,500,000. The claims under fifty dollars were paid in cash while
the large creditors received bonds. A better and simpler system
of accounttig and auditing was introduced, and graft in the purchase
of supplies and salaries was abolished. A study was made of the
tariff and as a result a new tariff was passed in 1920 which re-
(58) Welles, Sumrier - Naboth's Vineyard p. 796
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duced the rates about 38$, a reduction which incidentally benefited
United States industries (59).
The land survey was difficult because there was much con-
fusion regarding land titles, the original grants having been made
from time to time by Spanish monarchs, who left the boundaries
vague and inaccurate. There was no efficient system of transfer and
many records had been destroyed or set aside. Land titles were
further confused by a communal system of land tenure where there
were a number of heirs. In the confusion that resulted from the
successive occupation by France, Haiti, and Spain, and from chronic
revolution, the few titles that were registered were lost. To clear
up this confusion a land registration law was enacted which gave
clear title to land occupied for ten Jears previous to 1921. In
view of the fact that in 1925 the assessed value of the principal
sugar plantations was over forty million dollars, and that these
were chiefly owned by Americans it would seem that the clearing of
land titles like the tariff would react to the benefit of United
States and her citizens.
The military government found the educational system in
bad shape. Teachers and schools were miserable, enrollment small,
and attendance poor. The government of occupation, built and
equipped new schools, engaged better teachers, and as a result
the enrollment increaded 18,000 to 100,000, and attendance in-
creased from 21% to 85$ (60)
(59) Foreign Relations 1929 -.p 94
(60) 11 " w p. 96
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The military government also claimed the credit for keeping
peace, improving the sanitary conditions in the towns and improv-
ing the telephone, telegraph and postal systems. The length of
time it took to send a letter across the island was reduced by third.
An excellent highway system was planned which called for
afcterial highways connecting the chief cities. Public buildings
were repaired, wharves extended, harbors dredged. The charge has
been made that the military government spent large sums on public
improvement but had little to show for it, that the work was put in
charge of young and inexperienced engineers who squandered money
in impracticable labor saving devices which when purchased were
found unusable and were left to rust (61). The result was that
funds ran out and the work stopped. It must be remembered that road
building in Santo Domingo was an expensive proposition. Because of
the heavy rainfall, roads must be solidly built, stone must be
hauled by long distances over swampy land and expensive delays
occurred through no fault of the military government. This road
building program made possible the development of agriculture in
the interior provinces which are the richest.
At first, the majority of Dominicans did not look on occu-
pation by the United States as an unfriendly act, but rather as a
relief from continued revolution and welcomed the peace and order
which it brought. In the first years of military occupation,
Admiral Knapp was assisted by disinterested and loyal officers
and the tr- asury showed a surplus. As time went on, the United
States government failed in its opportunity to create a lasting
(61) Krippene, H. P. Santo Domingo's Title to Independence
CurrenF History April 1921 p. 808-812.
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and favorable impression so that in four years of military
administration the advantage we once held was lost. Dominicans
began to demand complete withdrawal.
In 1918 Knapp was succeeded by Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden
who lacked the forceful personality of his predecessor, and who
was guided by the advice of subordinates. His administration in-
creased the irritation and hostility of the Dominicans by complete-
ly ignoring their prejudices and desires. The new officials re-
fused to associate with the Dominican leaders and so fostered mis-
understanding and apprehension. While the World War was in progress
the United States paid little attention to affairs in Santo Domingo
so the Navy Department was able to assume absolute control with
Snowden as practical dictator. After the United States joined the
allies, most of our best officers were sent to France. Rumors be-
gan to circulate of excesses committed by some of the officers left
in Santo Domingo. Undoubtedly there was an element of truth in
these stories but there is always a tendency to magnify this sort
of thing sc that the excesses of a few may appear to be the excesses
of all. Because of much outspoken criticism of the military
government Snowden and his advisers unwisely censored the press
and prohibited freedom of speech. Some time later he made a gen-
eral statement to the effect that the military government would
continue "until the Dominicans in their cradles had reached adult
age" (62). The Dominican leaders who had looked upon the occupa-
tion as temporary now began to believe that it might result in a
more permanent control and became more uneasy.
(62) Welles, Sumner - Nab oth» s Vineyard _p/ 820
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It gradually dawned on Secretary Lansing that the continued
occupation was worrying other Latin American republics. Prom all
sides came the demand that United States withdraw her army of occu-
pation. In the face of growing opposition the State Department in
Washington instructed Snowden to appoint a Consulting Commission
so that the Dominicans might express their point of view. Such a
up
committee made/of four of the ablest Dominicans was appointed con-
sisting of Monsenor Nouel, Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Don Jacinto
de Castro, Don Francisco J. Peynado, and Don Federico Velasquez.
On November 12, 1919, the committee of four made a series of reports
which included a protest against the new foreign loan of $5,000,000
proposed by the military government (63). They recommended among
other things that the decrees censoring the press be suspended.
The military government replied by more strict censorship and the
Commission, feeling that the government of occupation was trying to
double-cross them, resigned January 9, 1920.
began a
The press of Latin America thereupon/determined campaign
against the military occupation of Santo Domingo, Agitation for
withdrawal continued. A Dominican poet, Fabio Fallio, was impris-
oned for attacking the military government. Dominicans went on
lecture tours through Latin America and Europe and were bitter in
the denunciation of the United States policy. Wilson was ill at the
time and did not know the Dominican situation but Secretary Colby
issued a proclamation on December 23, 1920, authorizing another
Dominican Commission as the first steps in the direction of eventual
withdrawal. The Commission was composed of seven members headed
by Monsenor Nouel, and Judge Ostrand of the Dominican Land Court
was to act temporarily as the technical adviser of the Commission (64 ).
(63) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard- p. 826
(64) Current History^ April 1921 p. 147
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This Commission was to amend the Constitution, revise the laws of
the Republic and draft a new electoral law. In spite of the fact
th8t the State Department had emphasized the hope th8t the American
technical adviser should be purely advisory, the Dominicans re-
fused to admit that United States cooperation was necessary and
demanded simply evacuation. They had come to believe that any at-
tempt to cooperate with the United States was an act of treason*
They even charged the Commission with treason for accepting the
appointments, and when Wilson ! s term was ended the Dominican problem
was still unsettled.
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American
V. Hughes 1 Negotiations for the Withdrawal of/Marines Leads to
the uonvertion of 1924
In a campaign speech of August 28, 1920, delivered at Marion
Ohio, Harding, a propos of the Dominican problem, put himself on
record as follows:
"... I will not • • • misuse the power of the
Executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated
acts of unwarranted interference in the domestic
affairs of the little republics of the Western
Hemisphere, such as in the last few years have
not only made enemies by those sho should be our
friends, but have rightly discredited our country as
their trusted neighbor" (65).
Secretary Hughes further stated the administration policy
on November 30, 1923 in an address delivered in Philadelphia:
"With respect to the Latin American republics it
is our policy not only to seek to adjust any dif-
ferences that may arise in our own intercourse, but
as I have said to extend our good offices to the
end that any controversy that they may have with
each other be amicably composed. We are seeking
to establish a Pax Americana maintained not by
arms but by mutual respect and good will and
tranquillizing processes of reason" (66).
(65) Quoted in Welles, p. 837
(66) Hughes, Chas. Evans. The Monfroe Doctrine, A review, its
relation to American Foreign Policy
in 20th Cv.ntury - The Pathway o f
Peace . p. 159
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Again, in a later address broadcast January 20, 1925,
he said:
"Pan American cooperation rests upon the conviction
that there are primary and mutual interests which
are peculiar to the republics of this hemisphere
and that these can best be conserved by taking
counsel together and by devising appropriate means
of collaboration"(67).
In accordance with this policy Hughes, June 24, 1921,
instructed the military government to issue a^roclamation promis-
ing that the military forces would be withdrawn in eight months
under certain conditions. A peaceable election must be held
under "supervision cff authorities designated by the military
governor" to choose a president and members of Congress, The
Convention of Evacuation must contain provision for
(1) Ratification of all acts of the military government.
(2) Validation of a loan of $2,500,000 to complete the
public works.
(3) The extension of the duties of the General Receiver
to apply to said loan.
(4) The extension of the duties of General Receiver to
the collection and disbursement of internal revenue
if customs duties are insufficient to meet the obliga-
tion of the foreign debt.
(5) The new president must send a request to the United
States President for a military mission to organize
(67) Hughes, C.E. Pathway of Empire - Address Latin JAmeri can
Relations p. 164-165
~
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a national guard (68).
A storm of protest immediately arose. The Domiiicans de-
manded freedom without qualification, refused to ratify the acts
of the military government which included a loan which carried an
interest varying from 9 to 19% • They demanded unconditional
sovereignty claiming that the revolutionary disturbances were pure-
ly political and minor in character and did not affect American
lives and property, that revolutions were usually more strategic
than bloody, that victory was gained by display of superior force
and that little life was lost. The revolutionists have ever been known
to suspend hostilities to let foreign business men pass goo* through.
The refusal of the Dominicans to accept these proposals
led to a deadlock. A period of political uncertainty resulted,
building programs were abandoned, economic depression resulted, and
political resentment increased. In April 1921, Washington announced
that the United States was seeking an orderly and careful method of
withdrawing the marines from Santo Eomingo which would satisfy
nationals and at the same time protect the interests of United States
and other countries (69 ) . Rear Admiral S. S. Robinson was detailed
on May 13 of the same year to be military governor of Santo Domingo
(69). The attitude of many Dominicans was well expressed in an
article by a Dominican poet, Fa bio Fallio, in Current History
(May 1921).
"The plan referred to provides for the creation of
a "Consultative Commission of Representative Dominicans
(69) Current History June 1921 p. 291
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to which is assigned by the will of the military
govennment 1 an American technical advsier. The
Commission is charged to draw up reforms in the laws
of the republic in accordance with the 'minutes*
presented to it by the technical adviser. In case any one
of these reform projects for the change of the national
law should itself necessitate the adoption of a con-
stitutional amendment by reason of any divergency from
the Constitution already in force, it will be the
adviser's duty to draw up the Constitutional Amendment
in question" (70).
Fallio prophecied that the work of the Commission would
degenerate into the work of the American technical adviser. The
new reforms would be at the mercy of the military governor who
could approve them or change them or declare them in force. After
the proclamation was made, the military government was to call a
general election of a Congress to consider the constitutional amend-
ments. After the amendments were approved an election would be held
for the election of the president and this would mark the withdrawal
of the military government. Fallio branded the whole scheme as
only an "illegal stratagem to an appearance of legitimacy" (71^.
The Consultative Commission was to have no power to veto or obstruct
the will of the governor, The government had the power to amend any
changes without consulting the Commission while there was no proof
that the election would represent popular will.
"The true object ot the whole plan seems to be to
awaken personal ambitions and rivalries in the
expectation that the various political factions,
292-293
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impelled by degrading enticement, will abandon
every consideration of respect of decency and
of the safety of the republic's sovereignty, in
order to vie with one another for the favor of
the omnipotent authorities of the occupation
even though the price of such favor will be in
very fact an injury to that sovereignty" (7$)«
There was moreover no assurance that the military occupation
cease for the vague promise to "withdraw from the responsibility
assumed in connection with Dominican affairs certainly contains
no specific promise in this regard and leaves this vital question
enshrouded in ominous obscurity" (7$)« Such were the sentiments
of Fabio Fallio and such were the sentiments of many of his com-
patriots*
Dominican opposition became more amd more bitter. They
demanded immediate evacuation, distrusted any election held under
the direction of the military government, declared the whole thing
to be a trick to continue the military government. The political
leaders announced that they wou Id discourage participation in the
proposed election so the State Department, at loss as to the best
course to follow, authorized the military government (July 27)
to announce postponement of the election and further delay in the
withdrawal of the military forces until the Dominicans were ready
to coopePBte. (72)
(72) Foreign Affairs 1929 p 101.
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Of course these events attracted much attention inthe
United States and elsewhere. Individuals visited the island and
reported on conditions. The Haiti and Santo Domingo Independence
Society was organized in New York and Horace G. Knowles, former
Minister to Santo Domingo, and who had also served as Minister to
Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Bolivia, became the spokesman (73).
He was the author of a "blistering denunciation of the continuation
of American occupation in Santo Domingo" published in Current Events
(June 1921). He sharply criticized the Wilson policy for blundering
unto the policy of invasion and military occupation. He blamed
Harding for not fulfilling his promises made in his campaign speeches
in regard to Santo Domingo. He denied that the Convention of 1907
had been violated and blamed the "maladministration and extravagance
of the American military government" for bringing the little repub-
lic to the brink of ruin" (74). In the meantime the lack of a
definite United States policy was causing commercial economic and
financial conditions to go from bad to worse.
On July 27, 1921, the Senate voted to have an investigation
and a committee of five was appointed to investigate the American
occupation and administration in Haiti and Santo Domingo. The com-
mittee included Senators McCormick (Chairman ), Oddie , Pemerene and
Jones. The coming of the Committee was known long beforehand and
the military government had plenty of time to get ready for inspection
It prepared a statement of the measures it deserved credit for and
(73) Thomas, D. Y. One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine p. 231
(74) Knowles, C. Santo Domingo(s Bitter Protest. Current History
June 1921 pp. 397-398
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turned it over tp the Committee.
1* It had kept up payments on the loan of 1908 which
they claimed would b e paid thirty-three years
before it was due.
2. Had paid in full the 1912 loan of $1,500,000.
3. Reformed the financial system.
4. Standardized the currency.
5. Reformed the banking laws.
6. Reformed the customs and port regulations.
7. Made a survey of natural resources.
8. Made a new mining law.
9. Carried out a program of public works.
of
10. Passed a law/eminent domain.
11. Made a pension law.
12. ' Improved the police force.
13. Improved sanitation and public health.
14. Improved education - The number of rural schools
was raised from none to 647 and the enrollment
increased from 18,000 to 100,000. The average at-
tendance grew from 40$ to 80$ while the salaries
were increased from $8. to $60. permonth to $55.
to $150. (75).
As for the political situation the Navy Department state-
ment read as follows:
(75) Hearings before a Select Committee of Haiti and
Santo Domingo 67th Congress.
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"Fortunately the election of Jimenez who took office on
December 5, 1914 was followed by a period of comparative calm in
the Dominican Republic, The elements of disorganization were pres-
ent, however, awaiting favorable opportunity for expression. In
April 1916 General Desi^erio Arias, Secretary of War, executed a
coup d'etat, deposed Jimenez, siezed the executive power. At this
point the United States government intervened and with the consent
of the rightful, but deposed Jimenez, landed naval forces on May 5,
1916, and pacified Santo Domingo City, the capital. Jimenez then
resigned snd the Council of Ministers assumed control of affairs"
(76).
The Commission was ins tructed to investigate two main
points, to determine whether the original landing and occupation
were valid, to investigate certain alleged atrocities. The
Dominicans made denial of four main points made by the Navy Depart-
ment: (1) that General Arias executed a coup d'etat and deposed
Jimenez; (2) that Arias siezed executive power; (3) that United
States forces pacified Santo Domingo City; (4) that Jimenez con-
sented to the landing of American troops. They denied that they had
violated the Convention of 1907, insisted that interest had been paid
regularly and that the deficit of $14,000. was owing in salaries to
soldiers and public officials and was brought on not by mismanage-
ment but byt the world crisis. They further claimed that the mili-
tary occupation was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, of the
Convention of 1907, and of Wilson's fourteenth point, and complained
that the American foreign office was on Wall Street. They brought
(76) Nation January 4, 1922 p. The Senato rs visit Haiti, and
Santo Domingo. Ernest H.
Gruenlng, Managing Editor
Nation p. 9
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charges of oppression 8nd a fen mutilated victims to Port au Prince
to testify, but the Committee had already left.
The Commission spent two and a half weeks on the island
"leaving a trail of hope, anticipation, doubt and disappointment"
(77), The Committee, after investigation, advised against removal
of the Americsn troops on the ground that the conditions laid down
by President Harding in the summer of 1921 had not been fulfilled.
These recommendations had provided that an election be held under
American auspices, that a loan floated by American bankers be
validated. Senator McCormick in a preliminary report admitted that
the program of public works was perhaps a "bit too ambitious" (78),
urged a new loan to refund the two previous ones of which he said
the services "including the provisions of their amortization are
unusual and crushing", crippling an ordinary administration.' The
loans, however, he believed had been necessary and were due to
Dominican violation of the Convention of 1907 and the situation
had been further complicated by the slump in business which had
decreased revenue. The report stressed the need of good roads which
would help keep down disturbances (79). The Committee commended the
financial situation under the military government though the slump
in business had resulted in a slump in revenue which could not ha^je
been foreseen.
Horace G. Knowles, who acted as counsel for the deposed
government on December 30, 1921, issued a statement denouncing
the report and charging that abuses, cruelties, and murders were com-
(77) Nation January 4, 1922 p. 7
(78) Thomas, D. Y. One Hundred Years of the I.Ionroe Doctrine p. 235
(78a) Current History Feb. 1922 p. 875
(79) New York Times July 12, 1922
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mitted by the marines. He claimed that the military occupation
v»8s a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and announced that since
American occupation banditry had increased ten fold due to the acts
of irresponsible young marines (80).
The next February, Secretary Hughes made new proposals in-
cluding one for a loan of $10,000,000. which the Dominicans refused
to consider, so Hughes proclaimed continued military government at
least until January 1, 1924 (81). On March 6, 1922, Rear Admiral
Robinson announced the annulment of the proclamation of June 24,
1921, which had stated the terms of withdrawal and announced that
the military government would continue its program of public works,
education and training of a military force. The proclamation of the
military government said (1) that the Dominican people having been
given ample tine to consider the proclamation of June 1921 had
shown no willingness to accept the terms: (2) that it would be
detrimental to the Dominican people to permit the present state
and suspense in governmental affairs to continue, therefore the
military government would continue according to the proclamation
of 1916 and would negotiate a loan for public works. (82) The
loan referred to was for $6,700, 000, its validation guaranteed by
the military government as a "legal, binding 8nd irrevocable obliga-
tion" of any government set up in the Republic (83). When the pro-
gram of public works was complete and the government had proven it-
self able to maintain order, the United States would consider with-
drawal on the following condition: (1) a fair election under super-
vision; (2) the ratification of a treaty providing for extensive
(80) Current History April 1922 p. 179
(81) Foreign Affairs p. 102
(82) Proclamation of Military Government of March 6, 1922
Nation 114 (1922) April 19 0. 480
(83) Current History May 1922 p. 338.
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duties of the receiver general until the loans were paid; and (3)
the "making of such other provisions as may appear to be of mutual
advantage to the United States and Dominican Republic". A protest
again was raised by the Dominicans especially against the loan, but
little attention was paid to them (84).
On April 15, it was announced that the United States marines
would not be withdrawn from Santo Domingo until July 1, 1924. Rear
Admiral Robinson stated that the withdrawal would depend on the
Dominicans themselves (85). The Dominican government must enter into
Convention with the United States to secure a loan because the politi-
cal unrest and business depression had reduced the treasury so that
it could not meet the government payroll, and officials and employees
were drawing halfcf pay. On Jufy 11, 1922, Secretary Hughes announced
in detail another pl8n for the withdrawal of American military forces
from the Dominican Republic and the restoration of full governmental
powers to the Dominican people (86). This was the plan of 1921
modified and formulated in conference with Senor Federico Velasquez
and Dr. Francisco Peynado, former Dominican Minister to the United
States. The plan provided that a provisional governwent composed of
Dominicans and elected by Dominicans would be installed to make neces-
sary legislative reforms and amendments to the constitution. When
that was accomplished a general election would be held without the
intervention of the United States to set up a permanent government.
When the provisional government was established the executive depart-
ments of the Republic would be turned over to the Cabinet ministers
(84) Nation 114 : p.480
(85) Current History June 1922 p 543
(86) Current History Aug. 1922 p 742
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appointed by the Provisional President. The Military officials who
had managed the various department during the occupation were to
cooperate with the new members of the cabinet to set the new govern
ment in motion. As soon as the Provisional government began to
function the military government would deliver to that government
the national palace and at the same time would concentrate the
military forces in two or three places. From thst time peace and
order would be maintained by the Dominican Natinnal Police under
the orders of the Provisional givernment unle ss there should occur
se ious disturbances which in the opinion of the Provisional Govern
ment could not be suppressed by the Dominican National Police.
A convention was to be ratified between the Dominican Re-
public and the United States containing the following provisions:
1. Recognition by the Dominican Republic of the
validity of all executive and departmental
orders promulgated by the Domincan government
with spe cif ic recognition by the Dominican
government of the bond issues authorized in
1918 and 1922.
2. An agreement between the two governments that
the Convention of 1907 should remain in force
as long as any bonds of 1918 and 1922 should
remain unpaid and that the duties of the Gen-
eral Receiver of the Dominican Customs ap-
of
pointed under the Convent ion/IVOI should be
/
(64)
extended to include the collection and appli-
cation of the revenues pledged for the service of the
bond i ssues (87 )
.
The above-mentioned Convention must be ratified by the
new Congress before elections would be held in accordance with
the Constitution. After the inauguration of the Constitutional
President, he must approve the Convention and the Provisional
Government would terminate. Immediately after, the military
forces would leave the Republic.
Ths State Department had withdrawn its demands for a
financial adviser to collect the interanl revenue and a Dominican
police force under United States officers. Withdrawal was as
nearly unconditional as could be without creating confusion.
Harding appointed Sumner Welles, the former chief of the Latin
American Division of the State Department, to go to Santo Domingo
with the rank of minister to report on political conditions there
and to find out if thr plan was acceptable to the Dominican people.
Welles reported that the agreement was satisfactory. A Commission
made up of Dominicans representing the various factions was appointed.
Mr. Welles, as a member of the Commission, displayed rare tact so
that the work of the Commission was not wrecked by the unsympathetic
attitude of the military authorities or the jealousies of the
Dominican politicians (88). Even Horace G. Knowles, the most
severe American critic of our foreign policy in S8nto Domingo,
(87) Current History Aug. 1922 p. 742
(88) Foreign Affairs 1929 p. 104
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announced his acceptance of the plan for the withdrawal of the
United States military forces. He said the plan was more than
he expected{89 ).
(89) Current History Dec. 1922 page 526
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VI. Santo Domingo Today and our New Foreign Policy.
The Dominican members of the Commission chose a neutral
in politics, Juan Bautisti Vicini Burgos, for provisional pres-
ident and selected a cabinet to assist him, Burgos took oath of
office as Provisional President October 21, 1922, thus ending the
regime of American occupation (90), The United States forces
wereconcentrated at various points and took no further administra-
tive part. Their commander remained on good terms with the new
government and did some excellent work in training the Dominicans
totake charge of the new national police which was now well or-
ganized •
President Harding cabled his congratulations to the new
republic, the executive offices we e turned over to the new cabinet
and the National Palace washanded over to the Provisional Govern-
ment, The military governor, Admiral S. S. Kobinson, sailed with
his staff October 24 leaving General Harry Lee in command of 1500
marines, who remained wntil the Constitutional government succeeded
the provisional government (91 )• Yftien final withdrawal of troops
was delayed by difficulties over the new electsral law, Sumner Welles
hurried to the island to help straighten out the difficulty, and
by Ms tact prevented an open rupture. The Provisional President,
Vicini Burgos, proved a good administrator, and in March 1924 gen-
eral elections were held. The National and Progressive parties
allied and elected Horacio Vssquez President, and Velasquez, Vice
President, and they were inaugurated July 12, 1924. The United
(90) Current History Sept 1922 p. 1094
(91) Current History Dec. 1922 P.526
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States Senate on January 21, 1925, ratified the treaties with the
Dominican Republic by which the withdrawal of American Military
forces from the Dominican Republic was confirmed and the method
of refunding the $25,000,000 debt was described
•
In 1925 it looked as if the Dominican troubles were over
though there were many who were pessimistic. The Nation (Feb, 11,
1925) in a skeptical vein commented on the situation in an article
entitled "What Price Freedom". Though Santo Domingo was restored
to the "glory of independence" and admitted into the family of
the League of Nations, attention was called to the fact that the
"price of freedom" was the validation of "several 6f the execu-
tive orders and resolutions" and "administrative regulations".
Included in these orders and resolutions were 593 executive orders,
65 department resolutions, 34 department orders, 26 water titles,
6 international treaties, a sanitary code, a treasury circular, 41
treasury contracts, 11 other departmental contracts, and the bond
issues of 1918 and 1922.
The 1924 Convention authorized the Dominican government
to borrow a maximum of $§5,000,000. The President of the United
States appointed a Receiver General of Dominican customs to col-
lect the customs and apply them to the service of the outstanding
bond issues and pay the balance to the Dominican government. If
receipts exceeded $4,000,000. in any one year, IQffo of the excess
was to be applied to the redemption of outstanding bonds (92).
The Dominican government promised not to increase the public debt
(92) Foreign Relations p. 104
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except by agreement with the United States and not to modify the
customs duties uteless the new rates provided lj? times the amount
necessary for the interest on the public debt. Article II which
reads the same as a clause in the Convention of 1907 says, "The
Dominican Government will provide by law for the payment of all
customs duties to the General Receiver and his assistants and will
give them all needful aid and assistance and full protection to
the extent of its powers. The government of the UnitedStates will
give to the Receiver General and his assistants such protection as
it may find to be requisite for the preformance of their duties".
This clause is vague and might be interpreted to make the United
States the arbiter of what obligations and privileges are permitted
(93).
V/hen the Convention was made public, seventeen of the
thirty members of the Chamber of Deputies expressed their opposition
by signing the "Pact of Honor", charging that the new treaty was a
violation of Dominican Sovereignty, that the loan of twenty-five
million would prolong the state of Dominican subordination to the
United States. They therefore pledged themselves to vote against
the treaty 8nd loan.
In the Upper House a redistribution of government patronage
served to get a sufficient number of votes for ratification but the
Pact of Honor halted it in the lower house. The Dominican Constitu-
tion requires the presence of two thirds' of the members for a
quorum to do business. A smaller number may adjourn to a fixed day.
At the next session after the second adjournment a bare majority
(93) Norton, Henry Kittredge - Current History Oct. 1926 Pp 67-70

(69)
may act. Those who had signed the pact were absent at the session
of the Chamber which was to decide the question of the Convention.
Those present twice adjourned to a day fixed. The meeting after
the second adjournment was held on May 25. There were twenty-nine
deputies present including the "Pacta Men" (94). Those who favored
the Convention wore red ribbons and three of those who had signed
the ?act also wore red ribbons. Thus, there were fourteen who op-
posed the Convention and fifteen who favored it. Many of the group
that approved the Convention carried arms and the Pacta Group
demanded the removal of those armed from the floor. The presiding
officer refused to do this and the Pacta Group of fourteen withdrew
leaving fifteen members in session - not a majority. The fifteen
left could not legally take action but considered taking it il-
legally when one of the Pacta group returned to protest and while
he was present a hasty vote was taken. The records showed sixteen
present, fifteen ayes, and one not voting. The government then
informed the United States of the ratification (95).
The opposition of course protested not only to the method
by which ratification was obtained but to the fact that the conven-
tion provided for the settlement of int erhational disputes, first,
through diplomatic channels, 8nd if that failed, by arbitration.
They claimed that an attempt to settle disputes through diplomatic
channels would react to the disadvantage of their country in deal-
ing with a more powerful country. As the Constitution provided
(94) (95) Norton, Henry Kittredge, Current History Oct. 1925 pp
67-70
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for settlement of disputes by arbitration the opposition group
served notice on both governments that the treaty was invalid
and therefore not binding on the Dominican Republic. Records in
Washington showed that the official notification had been received
from the Doninican Government and the Convention went into effect.
According to the revised Constitution of January 9, 1929,
the President and Vice President are elected for four years. The
president cannot be re-elected or elected STice President immediate-
ly following his/term of president. On June 16, 1927, the Constitu-
tion was revised to extend the term of President Vasquez and Vice
President Velasquez and the members of Congress from 1928-1930. The
Vasquez administration has continued the program of public works,
commerce has been encouraged, natural resources have been devel-
oped and irrigation projects plsnned. The biggest present day
problem is the regulation of foreign capital so that it will not
infringe on Dominican sovereignty. In 1929 President Vasquez
invited Sumner Welles to bring a Commission to Santo Domingo "to
recommend a scientific budget system"(96). The Commission headed
by General Dawes concerned itself only with xkH expenditures and was
unofficial as far as the United States was concerned. The fact
came
that the invitation/from Santo Domingo would indicate that
it no longer feared United States intervention, The Committee
worked for three weeks intensively, made a report of conditions,
suggested recommendations and left Santo Domingo free to do what
it would with it (97).
The Vasquez administration lasted until March 4, 1930
when a revolution lasting less than a week forced President Horacio
Vasquez to resign in favor of General Rafael Estrella whCo will hold
office as Provisional President until the regular election on May
(95) Current History August 1927 p. 805
(96) Nation March 13, 1929 p. 298
(97) Literary Digest Apr. 13, 1929 p. 13
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15. Recently President Vasquez announced his intention of running
for re-election in May but certain Dominican factions v/ere deter-
mined to give the Dominican people the chance for a free and fair
election, and to do this staged a bloodless revolution against the
established government. This revolution started suddenly in the
northern provinces on February 23 and within five days the insur-
gents were almost in complete control of the capital and elsev/here.
Charles B. Curtis, the American Minister to the Dominican Republic
went into the field to urge the revolutionaries to avoid fighting.
The Associated Press announced that only one casualty occurred and
that was not officially reported. The Vice President, Jose
Alfonseca promptly resigned and President Vasquez was forced to take
refuge in the old fortress of Santo Domingo City. Two days later
he sought protection in the American legation where a conference was
held representing both the government and the insurgents who came
to an agreement along constitutional lines. On the same day when
the Hoover Commission arrived in Haiti President Vasquez signed a
decree naming General Rafael Estrella Urena Secretary of State for
the Interior which would, according to the Constitution, put him
in line for the provisional presidency in ca^e Vasquez resigned.
Then Vasquez asked permission to leave the country "for his health".
The new president took office on March 4. It is interesting to note
that this revolution unlike so many of the earlier ones really
involved a constitutional question and that it was settled in an
orderly fashion by the Dominicans themselves, without American
interference
.
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Summary and Conclusion.
The problems of the Dominican Republic have been of the
sort easy to diagnose but difficult to cure. After discovery by
Columbus it enjoyed prosperity which was gradually destroyed by
the fact that the lure of gold attracted the oarly settlers
elsewhere, by the subsequent attacks of the English adverturers
and the raids of the pirates that infested the Caribbean. The
Dominicans survived the early difficulties only to fall prey to the
Haitians who dominated them for ars, a domination which accord-
ing to Y/elles, was responsible for their lack of training in self
government that resulted in later misgovernment . Even after the
Dominicans declared their indepence the threat of Haitian invasion
and reconquest hung over them like Damocles' sword and contributed
to the policital instability which has plagued the Republic ever
since
•
Since Dominican independence the Republic has been unfortunate
in the character of many of its leaders. Self-seekers, ambitions
for power or for the more material benefits they might gain,
their inefficiency , has been either because of their indolence, arbi-
tary actions, or dishonesty of administration. Intrigues by those
politically ambitious seemed to breed there as abundantly as the
tropical vegetation. Governments have spent their revenues to
keep themselves in power and when the taxing possibilities were
wrung dry, in desperation they turned to foreign powers to inter-
vene and save them ,insisting all the time that what they desired
was also the will of the Dominican people. This is the explana-
tion cf the ill-starred Spanish protectorate which the Dominicans
at first accepted passively butw hich proved such a titter disap-
pointment. The various appeals to the United States did not come
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"because the Dominican people desired, then but because some govern-
ment had reached the end of its rope and used these appeals as the
last resofct.
There have been short periods of peace and prosperity in
Santo Domingo but when this happened and the revenue began to in-
crease and things began to run smoothly, the temptation was too
Great for some ambitious leader to come from seclusion either in
his country estate or In one of the neighboring islands .where many
a plot was hatched, rally his followers around him by promises cf
material gain and attempt to overthrow the government. If success-
ful, the insurgents then proceeded to squander the profits of good
government and bring about a deficit. Too often Dominican statesmen
were dominated by the hope of personal gain and not enough by the
spirit of self sacrificing devotion to the interests of his country.
If, by chance, an honest, well-meaning man came into pov/er he proved
too weak to control the various political factions and leaders ar.d
did not last long.
The geographical and climatic conditions have flone their
part to prevent the establishment of a stable government. A moun-
tain range divides the 'island into a northern and southern section
and the lack of communication has dev&oped a strong feeling of
sectionalism. The northern part, chiefly devoted to tobacco culture
has been the hot bed of many revolutionary enterprises. The south
produces much sugar.
There are those who claim that real democracy can never
exist in the tropics. This is the belief of Captain Cecil Sherman
Baker of the United States Navy in an article in Current History
for February 1930. He maintains that the inhabitants of the temper-
ate zone to survive must develop foresight, courage, persistance,
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and cooperation. On the other hand, the tropics abound in a
multitude of food crops that need only to be picked. One nay
here gain a living with the least possible effort. The climate
is hot and discourages sustained effort and the natives are
Dlunged into a state of inertia. To prove his point, he comments
on the fact that during the American Revolution many loyal British
migrated, some to Canada and some to the Bahamas. In Canada they
prospered and built a stable government. In the Bahamas they de-
generated into poor whites. He i s pessimistic about the future of
Caribbean peoples because he says that four hundred years of con-
tact with Europeans has not bettered their condition, "The unre-
lenting hand of Nature in its kindest mood lulled them to economic
sleep. From this they were unable to emerge unaided ( ttrf" Occasion-
ally the white man has attempted to give to the Caribbean peoples
some degree of democratic government but because of their ignorance
and temperament they were unable to carry on. Hume Wrong, the
leading authority on British government, makes the following state-
ment in the same vein.
"No social contrast could be greater than that
between Canada and Jamaica, v/ithin the one a virile
and politically minded people, in the other a hand-
ful of white oligarchs, a smaller number of colored
demagogues, and a huge black residue in a state of
complete political inertia".
Great Britain recognizing this made Jamaica a crown colony
in 1S65.
Three hundred years of experimentation in
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governmental machinery in many of the Caribbean
islands still finds the Governor in control. For
there a good Governor with a sympathetic heart
is of more value than a good legal code. The
wise employment of lav/s by such an official fre-
quently offsets faults in his administration. In
Caribbean America the native looks up to authori-
ty wisely employed and firmly administered. If
there be no respect for lav/ as such there is respect
for authority. This is the rich political soil
in which dictators grow and flourish" £i6")
The apointnent of an outsider to govern works far better
than the votes of the ignorant and indifferent voters who have lost
initiative and the spirit of cooperation. They need therefore the
white man's help as they x are temperamentally unable to maintain
a stable government. Moreover, much benefit can be obtained by
a small retaining force of responsible men. There is undoubtedly
some truth in this belief and the degree of truth should help
determine the degree of "United States help or intervention.
If it were not for the fact that Santo Domingo lies at a
crossroads of the worldfe commerce, her history might have been
different. Because of that our foreign policy has been much con-
cerned with the Dominican problems, both internal and foreign.
Here again the United States policy is easy to criticise, but
not so easy to correct. Our Latin American policy has been a
shifting one, changing with the administrations. The wave of
(1^) Current History February 1930.
^ ||

territorial expansion that preceded the Civil War and obtained
for us the Mexican cession led to some interest in Dominican an-
nexation in Pierce's administration. Such an annexation would
have increased slave territory and would have been popular in
the Scuth, but nothing came of it • Seward and Grant continued
to wrestle with the problem of Dominican annexation but by thfe
time the wave had spent itself and there was little enthusiasm
for such a move except among certain American speculators who
were encouraged by Dictator 3aez who was in desperate straits
and looked to annexation by the United States as the last resort.
Another wave of territorial expansion came in the last
century
decade of the nine teenth Aand resulted in the annexation of Porto
Rico and the establishment of a protectorate over Cuba. By this
time the United States foreign policy seemed to be to accept "the
whitte man's burden" to educate and civilize the uneducated and
uncivilized and to clean up America. By the time Roosevelt be-
came President, the Dominican problem had become acute because she
had ignored her financial obligations and had brought upon herself
the dangers of foreign interference. Much is said of the Roosevelt
Corollary, "to speak softly and carry a big stick". As a matter
of fact Roosevelt handled the Domincan situation with remarkable
tact, common sense and clear-sightedness. The aim of the Roose-
velt administration was to correct the evils in Santo Domingo so
that the arguments of the annexationists might be destroyed. He
persuaded the Dominican government to request a receivership so
that the whole affair looked perfectly legal and so that the
national pride of the Dominicans was not injured. In all the ne-
gotiations he was careful to treat the little republic as an equal srt*
and a sovereign state and as a result carried through his program
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with little friction and little resentment on the part of the
Dominicans. His program was one of cooperation rather than one of
exploitation or intervention and through the Convention of 1907
was able to estabi ish Dominican credit. The only false note is
the suspicion bred in Latin America because of his alleged high
handed policy in Panama, but even here there is some justifica-
tion for his action.
With the policies of Taft and Knox, we enter the era of
"dollar diplomacy" in dealing with Latin America- and others. The
United States here adopted an irritating, patronizing, and superior
attitude and tried to force on the Dominicans an unpopular govern-
ment.
The Wilson administration was one thing in theory and
another in practice and was handicapped as far as the Dominican
policy was concerned by the fact that we were using our best
energies to straighten out the European situation and did not
have time to solve the problems nearer home. The policy proclaimed
the necessity of winning the confidence of the Latin American
peoples but bungled in its application to Santo Domingo because
of lack of understanding of the Dominican people and because of
unwise appointments of those to carry out our policies. As a
result, the Dominican situation got wholly out of control and the
problem was handed over to the Harding administration for solution.
Hughes tried to gain the friendship of the Dominicans and^t-o
get rid of the causes for unrest, but by this time the little
Republic had lost confidence in the friendship of the United States
and were not willing to cooperate. Hughes demonstrated great
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patience and a spirit of compromise and by 1924 some sort of a
settlement was made and the army of occupation was withdrawn.
Apparently Washington has learned its lesson from the Dominican
difficulties and there appears to he in the process of formation
a more definite Latin American policy, the basis of which seems to
be the fostering of a friendly spirit, cooperation, non-interference
unless such interference is absolutely necessary. The time has come
for us to realize that the problems of the Western Hemisphere can
be solved best by Pan American cooperation rather than by United
States paternalism.
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